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IMPLICATIONS OF CORPORATE INDEBTEDNESS FOR MONETARY POLICY
ABSTRACT
The extraordinary increase in reliance on debt by U.S. business in the
1980s has generated widespread concern that overextended borrowers may become
unable to meet their obligations and that proliferating defaults could then
lead to some kind of rupture of the financial system, with ensuing consequences
for the nonfinancial economy as well. The thesis advanced in this paper,
however, is that the more likely threat posed by a continuing rapid rise of
corporate indebtedness is instead a return to rapid price inflation. In
particular, a review of recent developments lead to four specific conclusions:
First, problems of debt service within the private sector are more likely
to arise among business borrowers, not households. Because businesses, and
especially corporations, have used much of the proceeds of their borrowing
merely to pay down their own or other firms' equity, their interest payments
have risen to postwar record levels compared to either their earnings or their
cash flows.
Second, despite these high debt service burdens, debt default on a scale
large enough to threaten the financial system as a whole is unlikely in the
absence of a general economic downturn. But the sharp increase in indebtedness
has made U.S. businesses crucially dependent on continued strong earnings
growth.
Third, the consequent need to prevent a serious recession -- so as to
preclude the possibility of a systemic debt default -- will increasingly
constrain the Federal Reserve System's conduct of monetary policy. The Federal
Reserve's reluctance to risk a situation of spreading business (and LDC) debt
defaults, especially with the U.S. commercial banking system in its current
exposed position, will increasingly prevent it from either acquiescing in a
recession or bringing one about on its own initiative.
Fourth, over time this constraint will severely limit the ability o'
monetary policy to contain or reduce price inflation. Episodes of disi
in the United States since World War II have invariably involved busi'
recessions, including declines in business earnings and increases in
bankruptcies and defaults. If the economy's financial system has beco.,
fragile to withstand any but the shortest and shallowest recession, it i~
unlikely to be able to support a genuine attack on inflation by monetary
policy.
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